In spite of continued negotiations with the P5+1 (five permanent member countries of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) over its nuclear program, Iran has quietly continued to develop its ballistic missile program, and the United States appears unconcerned about this growing threat. The current Iranian deal contains multiple shortcomings, including tacit acceptance of Iran’s uranium enrichment and the heavy-water reactor at Arak (that could double as a plutonium factory), Iran’s continual obstruction of international investigators, and the lack of any provisions concerning Iran’s ballistic missile development. Even if the deal included provisions restraining the ballistic missile program, it still would not provide a satisfactory conclusion to the Iranian debacle, as the other negative outcomes would remain unaffected.

Iran already boasts the largest collection of missiles in the Middle East. Most of these missiles are short-range, intended for use in a tactical or battlefield scenario. A smaller number are medium-range, designed for deterrence in peacetime and retaliation in the event of war.

However, the regime is hardly content to stop there. Having outdone the rest of the region in short-range and medium-range missiles, Iran is currently seeking to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) under the guise of their nascent space program. An Iranian ICBM would have the range to strike almost anywhere, including America. Iran’s medium-range capabilities already threaten the U.S.’s regional and European allies.

Development of these powerful missiles falls neatly alongside nuclear capabilities. As David A. Cooper of the Naval War College testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs typically have been developed hand in glove, to the extent that no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear weapons has ever opted to sustain an indigenous intermediate- or longer-range ballistic missile program.” In other words, countries only develop missiles of this type when they plan to make them nuclear. Cooper continued on to say that if the Iranians decline to cease their ICBM program, “with no plausible answer for why they would still need these capabilities if not to deliver nuclear weapons, then it raises troubling questions about their ultimate goals.”

Iran’s continuing ballistic missile development raises multiple questions about the future of their nuclear weapons program. Despite any statements or concessions made concerning current nuclear enrichment, Iran’s parallel development of long-range missiles functions as a good indicator of the regime’s actual intentions vis-à-vis nuclear arms.

In the rush to obtain the cessation of Iran’s nuclear program, the Administration cannot overlook their ballistic missile program. Iran’s short-range and intermediate-range missiles pose significant threats to regional stability, and their long-range missiles would threaten the world. Additionally, continuation of this program communicates strong concerns as to Iran’s future nuclear intentions. The Administration should consider these programs an important part of their continued negotiations with Iran; failure to do so could result in a deal that only addresses half the problem.

Cameron Swathwood is currently a member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation. For more information on interning at Heritage, please click here.