



**THE COST OF DOING NOTHING:
HOW TIM WALZ AND KEITH ELLISON**

FUELED MINNESOTA'S FRAUD EXPLOSION

An Interim Staff Report by the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform Majority Staff

March 4, 2026

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Executive Summary

In December 2025, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform launched an investigation into fraud in Minnesota's social services programs that occurred under Governor Tim Walz and Attorney General Keith Ellison's watch. The Committee's investigation has found that senior officials in Minnesota state government, including Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison, were aware of widespread fraud in federally funded social services programs for years, possessed the legal and procedural authority to stop payments, but repeatedly failed to act. As a result, potentially billions of American taxpayer dollars were allowed to flow to fraudulent actors, while vulnerable populations were harmed and whistleblowers were ignored, sidelined, and retaliated against.

While the Committee's investigation remains ongoing, testimony and documents obtained to date establish a consistent pattern: fraud warnings were elevated to senior levels of the Minnesota state government, meaningful corrective action was delayed or avoided, and payments continued long after credible red flags emerged. The Committee has learned the following through its investigation so far (and evidence for these conclusions is presented in this report):

1. Senior officials in the Governor's office and Attorney General Ellison's office were aware of credible fraud concerns in Minnesota's social services programs as early as 2019 within the Department of Human Services (DHS) and by April 2020 within the Department of Education (MDE), despite later public statements by Governor Walz suggesting otherwise.
2. Minnesota state agencies had clear authority to suspend or stop payments to providers suspected of fraud without requiring independent direction from courts, law enforcement agencies, or the federal government.
3. In the case of Feeding our Future (FOF), MDE continued payments voluntarily, even after identifying serious program deficiencies and despite no court order to resume payments.
4. Litigation threats and fear of accusations of discrimination, not legal or regulatory barriers, were repeatedly cited by state officials as the reason for continued funding of entities suspected of fraud.
5. Despite Governor Walz's claims, law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), never directed Minnesota state officials to continue payments to Feeding our Future or other suspected fraudulent providers.
6. These failures allowed an estimated \$300 million in federal child nutrition funds and potentially \$9 billion in Medicaid-related funds to be lost or placed at serious risk.

The Committee's findings raise serious questions about governance and oversight in Minnesota's administration of federal funds. The failure to act decisively in the face of known fraud allowed criminal schemes to flourish and diverted resources away from eligible recipients: the vulnerable populations these programs were intended to serve.

The Committee’s Investigation into Widespread Fraud in Minnesota’s Social Services Programs

On December 3, 2025, the Committee launched an investigation into reports of widespread fraud in Minnesota’s social services programs, sending formal requests to Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison expressing concern that they “were fully aware of this fraud and chose not to act for fear of political retaliation,” allowing billions of taxpayer dollars to be stolen.¹ The Chairman’s letters requested documents and communications showing knowledge of or participation in widespread fraud in Minnesota and whether Governor Walz or Attorney General Ellison limited or stopped investigations into this fraud.² On December 17, 2025, the Minnesota Solicitor General and the Attorney General’s office responded on behalf of Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison by producing only a limited and incomplete set of documents and communications responsive to the December 3, 2025, letter.³ Governor Walz’s office produced only a mixed set of 48 documents and email communications, many of which contained publicly available information or were duplicative, totaling 177 pages.⁴ Attorney General Ellison’s office produced only 11 documents (including one duplicate), totaling 97 pages.⁵

During its investigation, the Committee conducted transcribed interviews with nine key current and former Minnesota state officials:

- **Emily Honer**, Director of Nutrition Program Services for MDE (2023 to Present)
- **Daron Korte**, Assistant Commissioner for MDE (2014 to Present)
- **Mary Cathryn Ricker**, Former MDE Commissioner (2019 to 2021)
- **Tony Lourey**: Former DHS Commissioner (January 2019 to July 2019)
- **Dave Greeman**: Former DHS Chief Financial Officer (2021 to 2025)
- **Eric Grumdahl**, Former DHS Assistant Commissioner of Homelessness & Housing Support (2022 to 2025)
- **Shireen Gandhi**, then-Temporary DHS Commissioner (2025 to Present)
- **Jodi Harpstead**, Former DHS Commissioner (2019 to 2025)
- **Chris Schmitter**, Former Chief of Staff for Governor Tim Walz (2019 to 2025)

¹ See Letter from James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Tim Walz, Governor, State of Minnesota (Dec. 3, 2025); see Letter from James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Keith Ellison, Att’y Gen., State of Minnesota (Dec. 3, 2025).

² See Letter from James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Tim Walz, Governor, State of Minnesota (Dec. 3, 2025); see Letter from James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Keith Ellison, Att’y Gen., State of Minnesota (Dec. 3, 2025).

³ Email from Staff, Office of Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, State of Minnesota to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Majority Staff (Dec. 17, 2025) (on file with the Committee); Email from John Stiles, Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Majority Staff (Dec. 17, 2025) (on file with the Committee).

⁴ Governor Walz Response dated Dec. 17, 2025 (on file with the Committee).

⁵ Att’y Gen. Ellison Response dated Dec. 17, 2025 (on file with the Committee).

Across these transcribed interviews, Majority Staff asked questions over a combined total of 36 hours and 46 minutes while Minority staff only asked questions for a combined total of just 3 hours and 14 minutes.

On December 22, Chairman Comer also sent a request to Attorney General Pam Bondi for staff-level briefings to learn about the DOJ's ongoing investigations, as well as a request to Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent requesting a staff-level briefing to learn more about how the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) monitors remittances and informal financial networks and its oversight and enforcement efforts to counter financing for terrorist networks.⁶ Chairman Comer also requested from Treasury Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) related to fraud in Minnesota.⁷ On January 15, 2026, a joint group from the FBI and DOJ's criminal division briefed committee staff of jurisdiction on their ongoing efforts in Minnesota.⁸ On January 23, 2026, the Department of Treasury and FinCEN briefed committee staff of jurisdiction on their efforts to identify and review appropriate SARs.⁹ The Committee continues to work with Treasury to identify and review appropriate SARs.

On January 23, 2026, the Committee sent a request to Minnesota Legislative Auditor (OLA) Judy Randall for a briefing on her office's work related to uncovering fraud¹⁰ specifically reports her office released in 2019 on the Childcare Assistance Program (CCAP)¹¹, in 2024 on Feeding Our Future and Minnesota's Department of Education,¹² and 2026 on DHS Behavioral Health Administration grant management.¹³ These reports examine waste, fraud, and abuse in several reimbursement and grant programs that involve federal dollars. The Minnesota OLA briefed Committee staff on their findings in these reports on February 10, 2026.¹⁴

On February 10, 2026, HHS's Office of Inspector General also briefed Committee staff on their efforts to prevent fraud in Minnesota's social services programs.¹⁵

⁶ See Letter from James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, to Pam Bondi, Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice (Dec. 22, 2025); see Letter from James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, to Scott Bessent, Sec'y, Dep't of Treasury (Dec. 22, 2025).

⁷ See Letter from James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, to Scott Bessent, Sec'y, Dep't of Treasury (Dec. 22, 2025).

⁸ Briefing from Department of Justice to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform Majority Staff (Jan. 15, 2026).

⁹ Briefing from Department of Treasury to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform Majority Staff (Jan. 23, 2026).

¹⁰ Letter from James Comer, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, to Judy Randall, Minnesota Legislative Auditor (Jan. 23, 2026).

¹¹ See MINNESOTA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, CHILDCARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ASSESSMENT OF FRAUD ALLEGATIONS (Mar. 2019).

¹² See MINNESOTA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: OVERSIGHT OF FEEDING OUR FUTURE (June 2024).

¹³ See MINNESOTA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR FINANCIAL AUDIT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES: BEHAVIORAL HEALTH GRANTS PERFORMANCE AUDIT (Jan. 6, 2026). BHA oversees adult mental health, children's mental health, and alcohol and drug abuse services.

¹⁴ Briefing from Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform Majority and Minority Staff (Feb. 10, 2026).

¹⁵ Briefing from HHS Office of Inspector General to H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform Majority Staff (Feb. 10, 2026).

Background

Since 2022, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota has brought charges against at least 98 individuals—the vast majority being Somali—in relation to fraud in Minnesota, with 60 having already pled guilty or been convicted at trial.¹⁶ In recent months, Minnesota’s Department of Human Service (DHS) designated 14 state Medicaid programs as “high-risk” due to significant fraud.¹⁷ According to claims data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), since 2018, these 14 “high-risk” programs have cost taxpayers more than \$18 billion, including \$3.5 billion in 2024 alone.¹⁸ Currently, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is investigating all of these programs, and the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota suspects that half or more of the \$18 billion in total expenditures was fraud.¹⁹ The former First Assistant U.S. Attorney stated these fraud schemes occurred in different programs, but they are interconnected, “form[ing] a web that has stolen billions of dollars in taxpayer money. Each case we bring exposes another strand of this network.”²⁰ After the federal government threatened to withhold all federal funding for Human Services programs in Minnesota because of this widespread fraud, Minnesota froze all provider enrollment for the high-risk programs in January 2026.²¹ Governor Walz has come under heavy criticism for not adequately addressing this fraud, and on January 5 announced that he was ending his campaign for a third term as Governor of Minnesota.²²

Minnesota Department of Education (MDE): \$300 Million in Fraud

Feeding Our Future (FOF) was a Minnesota-based nonprofit that was created to provide meals to needy schoolchildren during the COVID-19 pandemic.²³ FOF dissolved in early 2022 after federal investigators froze its assets.²⁴ In September 2022, federal prosecutors announced charges against 47 defendants, most of whom are from Minnesota’s Somali community,²⁵ in a fraud scheme alleged to have stolen nearly \$300 million in funds from the U.S. Department of

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Justice (@TheJusticeDept), X, (Dec. 29, 2025, 5:28 PM), *available at* <https://x.com/TheJusticeDept/status/2005767943964221610>; Attorney General Pamela Bondi (@AGPamBondi), X, (Dec. 29, 2025, 5:16 PM), *available at* <https://x.com/AGPamBondi/status/2005764911427731459?s=20>. (“@TheJusticeDept has been investigating this for months. So far, we have charged 98 individuals – **85 of Somali descent** – and more than 60 have been found guilty in court”) (emphasis added).

¹⁷ Press Release, Office of Governor Tim Walz & Lt. Governor Peggy Flanagan, Governor Walz Orders Third-Party Audit of Medicaid Billing at DHS (Oct. 29, 2025).

¹⁸ Alpha News, *LIVE: First Assistant US Attorney Joe Thompson provides major update on fraud in Minnesota*, YOUTUBE (Dec. 18, 2025), *available at* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-JwgzrffWc>, at 16:27.

¹⁹ *Id.* at 22:34.

²⁰ Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, First Defendant Charged in Autism Fraud Scheme (Sept. 24, 2025).

²¹ Riley Moser, *Minnesota DHS freezes new provider enrollment for 13 Medicaid services over fraud concerns*, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2026).

²² Melissa Turtinen, *Tim Walz ends reelection campaign for governor of Minnesota*, FOX 9 (Jan. 5, 2025).

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ Eric Rasmussen, *Feeding our Future plans to dissolve as federal investigation continues*, KSTP (Feb. 25, 2022).

²⁵ Attorney General Pamela Bondi (@AGPamBondi), X, (Dec. 29, 2025, 6:16 PM), *available at* <https://x.com/AGPamBondi/status/2005764911427731459?s=20>.

Agriculture's Federal Child Nutrition Program (FCNP)²⁶, specifically the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP)²⁷ and the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP)²⁸, administered by the MDE.²⁹ Meals funded by the FCNP are served at sites which must be sponsored by an authorized nonprofit organization (i.e. Feeding Our Future), and sponsors are responsible for monitoring sites and preparing reimbursement claims for meals and snacks provided.³⁰

During the COVID-19 pandemic, USDA waived standard requirements for sponsors in the FCNP, including allowing off-site food distribution to children outside of education programs and allowing for-profit restaurants to participate.³¹ These waivers allowed fraud to be committed much more easily. The fraudsters provided MDE with fake invoices, claiming that FOF and its partners had fed thousands of children, when in reality, the meals were never provided.³² The fraudsters spent millions of taxpayer dollars on luxury cars, houses, foreign companies, and real estate projects in Minnesota, Ohio, Kentucky, and abroad.³³ MDE officials first became aware of suspicious activity related to FOF in early 2020, but chose to keep the money flowing.³⁴ The number of applicants, which overwhelmed MDE, caused MDE officials to question the validity of the invoices they were receiving, but they continued to pay out through January 2022.³⁵

Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS): Medicaid and Child Care Programs (Up to \$9 billion in fraud)

Minnesota provides taxpayer-funded subsidized child care for low income families through the Child Care Assistance Program (CCAP), which was formerly overseen by DHS until 2023 and is now overseen by the state's Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF).³⁶ In addition to being funded by state and county dollars, this program receives federal funding through HHS's Child Care and Development Fund.³⁷ This fund is made up of discretionary funds

²⁶ See 42 U.S.C. § 1771 *et seq.*; Keep Kids Fed Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-158, 136 Stat. 1309 (June 25, 2022) (The bill authorizes USDA to establish a nationwide waiver of statutory and regulatory requirements under child nutrition programs for the 2022-2023 school year.).

²⁷ 42 U.S.C. § 1766.

²⁸ 42 U.S.C. § 1761.

²⁹ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Announces Federal Charges Against 47 Defendants in \$250 Million Feeding Our Future Fraud Scheme (Sept. 20, 2022).

³⁰ Application for a Search Warrant, *In re Search of the Single-Family Home Located at 13299 Bronze Parkway, Rosemount, Minnesota 55068, as Further Described in Attachment A*, Case No. 22-MJ-040 TNL (Jan. 14, 2022), available at https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2022/docs/FeedingOurFuture_Records.pdf, at 12.

³¹ *Id.*

³² Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Announces Federal Charges Against 47 Defendants in \$250 Million Feeding Our Future Fraud Scheme (Sept. 20, 2022).

³³ Ernesto Londoño, *How Fraud Swamped Minnesota's Social Services System on Tim Walz's Watch*, THE N.Y. TIMES (updated Nov. 30, 2025); Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Minneapolis woman pleads guilty in \$250 million Feeding Our Future fraud scheme (Feb. 25, 2025); Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Announces Federal Charges Against 47 Defendants in \$250 Million Feeding Our Future Fraud Scheme (Sept. 20, 2022).

³⁴ Ernesto Londoño, *How Fraud Swamped Minnesota's Social Services System on Tim Walz's Watch*, THE N.Y. TIMES (updated Nov. 30, 2025).

³⁵ *Id.*

³⁶ *The Child Care Assistance Program*, MINNESOTA HOUSE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT (last visited Dec. 31, 2025) available at https://www.house.mn.gov/hrd/pubs/pap_ccap.pdf, at 3.

³⁷ *Id.* at 13.

authorized under the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act and both mandatory and matching funds appropriated under Section 418 of the Social Security Act.³⁸ There are 4,000 child care centers registered with CCAP in Minnesota alone.³⁹ These child care providers are supposed to be licensed and meet documentation requirements, including submitting accurate daily attendance information to the state to bill CCAP.⁴⁰

Consistent concerns about fraud in the CCAP program have been around since 2019 when DHS investigators revealed that child care centers, centered in the Somali community, had defrauded CCAP of at least \$100 million in 2017 through large-scale overbilling, money laundering, and kick-back schemes, in addition to providing substandard conditions for children.⁴¹ The report also alleged that a portion of this money was sent overseas to fund terrorists in Somalia and the Middle East.⁴² Concerns about CCAP fraud have recently come back into the public sphere when YouTuber Nick Shirley published a video of him and David Hoch visiting Somali-run child care centers that have collected millions of dollars in CCAP funds while having no signs of actually providing services to children.⁴³

According to DCYF spending forecasts, the state government expects CCAP expenditures to increase from nearly \$131 million in FY 2024 to over \$281.5 million in FY 2029, an increase of more than 115 percent.⁴⁴

14 “High Risk” Medicaid Programs

The Department of Justice is investigating 14 Medicaid programs in Minnesota that have been determined as “high-risk” for fraud.⁴⁵ The DOJ estimates that \$9 billion in federal dollars has gone to fraud in these programs since 2018.⁴⁶ In this investigation, the Committee has focused on four of these high-risk programs since they have had the most indictments and confirmed cases of fraud: Housing Stabilization Services (HSS), Early Intensive Developmental and Behavioral Intervention (EIDBI), Integrated Community Supports (ICS), and Non-Emergency Medical Transportation (NEMT).

³⁸ *Id.* Section 418 of the Social Security Act pertains to Child Care Entitlements to States.

³⁹ *Child Care Assistance Program Information for Child Care Providers*, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES (last visited Dec. 31, 2025), available at <https://dcyf.mn.gov/child-care-assistance-program-information-child-care-providers>.

⁴⁰ *Minnesota Child Care Assistance Program (CCAP) Child Care Provider Guide*, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES (last visited Dec. 31, 2025), available at <https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/lfserver/Public/DHS-5260-ENG>, at 48.

⁴¹ Kim Crockett, *Child care welfare fraud*, CENTER OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT (Spring 2019 Issue of Minnesota Thinking).

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ Nick Shirley, *I Investigated Minnesota’s Billion Dollar Fraud Scandal*, YOUTUBE (Dec. 26, 2025), available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8AulCA1aOQ>.

⁴⁴ MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, NOVEMBER 2025 FORECAST (Dec. 4, 2025), at 8.

⁴⁵ Alpha News, *LIVE: First Assistant US Attorney Joe Thompson provides major update on fraud in Minnesota*, YOUTUBE (Dec. 18, 2025), available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-JwgzrffWc>.

⁴⁶ *Id.*

a. Housing Stabilization Services (HSS)

Minnesota Housing Stabilization Services (HSS) is a Medicaid-funded program run by DHS that helps homeless people find and keep stable housing.⁴⁷ While Medicaid does not traditionally cover housing expenses, in 2019, Minnesota submitted a first-in-the-nation request through a State Plan Amendment under §1915(i) of the Social Security Act.⁴⁸ This allowed Minnesota to use Medicaid dollars to pay for certain housing-related services without limiting the number of people who could participate.⁴⁹

Initial estimates predicted the HSS program would cost \$2.6 million annually, but by 2024, it had skyrocketed to \$108 million per year.⁵⁰ From 2021, HSS went from 278 providers serving 8,126 recipients costing \$27.7 million to 883 providers serving 21,679 recipients costing over \$105 million in 2025.⁵¹ Companies defrauding HSS would identify vulnerable individuals leaving drug or mental health rehabilitation programs and enroll them in the HSS Program.⁵² The companies then billed Medicaid for services that were never provided, and most clients never received the services they desperately needed.⁵³ Fraudsters knew this program was so vulnerable they even travelled from out of state to steal Medicaid dollars.⁵⁴

On August 1, 2025, DHS moved to terminate the HSS Program⁵⁵ because of credible allegations of rampant fraud conducted by 77 providers and an assessment that DHS did not, “have the necessary tools to stop bad actors.”⁵⁶

⁴⁷ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, *Defendants Charged in First Wave of Housing Stabilization Fraud Cases* (Sept. 18, 2025).

⁴⁸ *Id.*; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, *State Plan Amendment Approval #18-00008* (Aug. 1, 2019), available at <https://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/State-resource-center/Medicaid-State-Plan-Amendments/Downloads/MN/MN-18-0008.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Manatt Health, *State Investments in Supportive Housing, State Health & Values Strategies*, 1-2 (Jan. 2020), available at <https://mn.gov/dhs/partners-and-providers/policies-procedures/housing-and-homelessness/housing-stabilization-services/housing-stabilization-services.jsp>.

⁵⁰ J. Patrick Coolican, *State shuts down \$107 million housing stabilization program, citing fraud*, MINNESOTA REFORMER (Aug. 1, 2025); Ernesto Londoño, *How Fraud Swamped Minnesota’s Social Services System on Tim Walz’s Watch*, THE N.Y. TIMES (updated Nov. 30, 2025).

⁵¹ Affidavit of Jared F. Kary in Support of an Application under Rule 41 for a Warrant to Search and Seize, *In re Search of the Business Office Located at 9217 17th Avenue South, Suite 203 Bloomington, Minnesota as Described in Attachment A*, No. 25-mj-861 (DTS) (D. Minnesota. Dec. 18, 2025), available at <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20260107/118796/HHRG-119-GO00-20260107-SD071.pdf>, at 8.

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, *Six Additional Defendants Charged, One Defendant Pleads Guilty in Ongoing Fraud Schemes* (Dec. 18, 2025).

⁵⁵ News Releases, Minnesota Department of Human Services, DHS moves to terminate Housing Stabilization Services program (Aug. 1, 2025).

⁵⁶ KSTP Staff, *DHS plans to terminate Housing Stabilization Services program amid concerns of fraud*, KSTP (updated Sept. 18, 2025).

b. Early Intensive Developmental and Behavioral Intervention (EIDBI) benefit

Minnesota offers services to children and young adults age 21 and under with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) through the Early Intensive Developmental and Behavioral Intervention (EIDBI) benefit.⁵⁷ To qualify, an enrollee must have had a Comprehensive Multi-Disciplinary evaluation to establish medical needs, be enrolled in a qualifying health care program, such as Medicaid, and have ASD or a related condition.⁵⁸

Between 2019 and 2024, the number of EIDBI service providers increased from 41 to 328, a 700 percent increase.⁵⁹ An estimated 1 in 12 eight-year-old Somali children in Minnesota allegedly have ASD, compared to only 1 in 28 eight-year-old children statewide.⁶⁰ Enrollment in the EIDBI increased from 791 recipients at a cost of \$20.4 million in 2019 to 5,705 recipients at a cost of over \$342 million.⁶¹

The DOJ has revealed that fraudsters contacted parents in the Somali community to recruit their children to attend treatment centers and helped obtain fraudulent autism diagnoses.⁶² The fraudsters paid monthly kickbacks to parents of enrolled children, with the amount ranging from \$300 to \$1,500 per month, depending on the level of services DHS approved for the child to receive.⁶³ Minnesota allowed EIDBI providers to operate without a license until early 2026.⁶⁴

c. Integrated Community Supports (ICS)

ICS is a Medicaid funded program⁶⁵ that provides support and training to adults with disabilities living in apartments and other residential settings in the community.⁶⁶ Like other

⁵⁷ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Minnesota, First Defendant Charged in Autism Fraud Scheme (Sept. 24, 2025).

⁵⁸ *Early Intensive Developmental and Behavioral Intervention (EIDBI) benefit*, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES (last visited Jan. 1, 2026), available at https://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&dDocName=DHS-293102&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased.

⁵⁹ Deena Winter, *States eyeing providers of autism services*, ACCESS PRESS (Aug. 1, 2024).

⁶⁰ Press Release, Minnesota Autism Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network, UMN researchers report 1 in 12 Somali children and 1 in 28 Hmong identified with autism in the Twin Cities metro area, according to CDC-funded study (Sept. 26, 2025).

⁶¹ Affidavit of Jared F. Kary in Support of an Application under Rule 41 for a Warrant to Search and Seize, *In re Search of the Business Office Located at 9217 17th Avenue South, Suite 203 Bloomington, Minnesota as Described in Attachment A*, No. 25-mj-861 (DTS) (D. Minnesota Dec. 18, 2025), available at <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20260107/118796/HHRG-119-GO00-20260107-SD071.pdf>, at 6.

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ Jenna Gloeb, *Just 6 of 500 state autism providers have sought to comply with new licensure requirement*, ALPHA NEWS (Feb. 25, 2026).

⁶⁵ *Home & Community Based Services Authorities, 1915(c)*, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (last visited Feb. 28, 2026), available at <https://www.medicare.gov/medicaid/home-community-based-services/home-community-based-services-authorities/home-community-based-services-1915c>.

⁶⁶ *Id.*

Minnesota state-run Medicaid programs, ICS experienced explosive growth following its inception in 2021.⁶⁷ In 2021, there were 28 ICS providers covering 164 recipients at a cost of \$4.6 million.⁶⁸ In 2024, there were 458 ICS providers covering 2,444 recipients costing over \$170 million.⁶⁹

The DOJ has confirmed that fraud in the ICS program has not only resulted in stolen federal dollars but caused the loss of life and homelessness of disabled program recipients. Rick Clemmer, a disabled ICS recipient, was neglected by his service providers and found dead in his apartment in March 2025.⁷⁰ In June 2025 a disabled woman living in an apartment paid for by ICS was evicted because her caregivers, American Home Health Care LLC, who were subletting her apartment, stopped paying her rent.⁷¹

d. Non-emergency medical transportation (NEMT)

NEMT is another high-risk Medicaid program that has had fraud issues in the past.⁷² A report from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General revealed that DHS improperly claimed Medicaid reimbursement for over \$1.8 million.⁷³ The federal government found that Minnesota failed to document all services in accordance with Federal and state requirements and provide services to beneficiaries receiving Medicaid-covered services.⁷⁴ Recent public awareness of fraud in the NEMT program stems from Nick Shirley's reporting on suspicious providers operating out of apartment complexes, unmarked offices, and a corner store, including some companies that are listed at one single address.⁷⁵ Shirley's reporting shows how one of the company locations does not even have a parking space for the vehicles and others have vehicles present, but no visible signs of use.⁷⁶

⁶⁷ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Minnesota, *Six Additional Defendants Charged, One Defendant Pleads Guilty in Ongoing Fraud Schemes* (Dec. 18, 2025).

⁶⁸ Affidavit of Jared F. Kary in Support of an Application under Rule 41 for a Warrant to Search and Seize, *In re Search of the Business Office Located at 9217 17th Avenue South, Suite 203 Bloomington, Minnesota as Described in Attachment A*, No. 25-mj-861 (DTS) (D. Minnesota. Dec. 18, 2025), available at <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20260107/118796/HHRG-119-GO00-20260107-SD071.pdf>, at 12.

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ A.J. Lagoe, *et al.*, *KARE 11 Investigates: Death raises new fraud allegations in Minnesota's Medicaid-funded ICS program*, KARE 11 (updated Nov. 20, 2025).

⁷¹ A.J. Lagoe, *et al.*, *KARE 11 Investigates: Evicted, homeless, paying the price for Minnesota's fraud crisis*, KARE 11 (updated Feb. 13, 2026).

⁷² See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., MINNESOTA DID NOT ALWAYS COMPLY WITH FEDERAL AND STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLAIMS SUBMITTED FOR THE NONEMERGENCY MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM (Sept. 15, 2017).

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ *Id.*

⁷⁵ Elaine Mallon, *YouTuber alleges an additional \$16M in fraud tied to Minnesota transportation companies*, KOMO NEWS (Jan. 15, 2026).

⁷⁶ *Id.*

Preliminary Findings

Preliminary Finding #1:

a) Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison knew about fraud in the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) and the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) as early as April 2020, despite contrary claims made to the media.

b) Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison knew about fraud in the Child Care Assistance Program as well as Non-Emergency Medical Transportation program as early as spring 2019.

c) The Governor and Attorney General also became aware of fraud in 13 additional high-risk Medicaid programs at various times during their tenure and failed to act.

1. Feeding Our Future

- In 2019, MDE received allegations from USDA that Feeding our Future was created using forged signatures and misled sponsored sites about federal CACFP requirements.⁷⁷ The source, Partners in Nutrition, which is now-convicted fraudster and former FOF executive director Aimee Bock's previous organization, making the allegations said it referred the matter to law enforcement and the Attorney General.⁷⁸ MDE nonetheless dismissed these allegations as merely complaints.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Letter from Kara Lomen, Executive Director, Partners in Nutrition, to USDA Food and Nutrition Services, Midwest Regional Office (Feb. 20, 2019) (on file with the Committee).

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Human Services, at 78 (Feb. 3, 2026).

MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q According to the OLA report, between 2018 and 2021, MDE received a series of complaints about Feeding our Future, including allegations about unethical recruiting practices, kickbacks, and theft or forgery. Do you recall MDE receiving complaints of this nature about Feeding our Future?

A Yes.

Q Could you expand upon that, please?

A So the complaints were coming from Partners in Nutrition. There wasn't any real evidence or substance to the allegations. It was just complaints. When we asked for more information - or when our staff asked for more information, my understanding is it really wasn't provided to them. So there really wasn't- anything actionable there other than just accusations.

Q So these sounded like, you know, serious allegations that may, you know, potentially suggest fraud. Could you explain what - I know you just mentioned that your staff didn't receive any information back when they looked into- those complaints, but did your staff take any other steps to investigate those complaints?

A Not that I'm aware of other than attempting to get more information about the complaints from the complainant. Of course there would have been the routine, you know, monitoring processes that would have - Feeding our Future would have been subject to-. But, aside from those two things, I don't believe, that I'm aware of, there was additional investigation regarding those complaints.

- Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte testified that Governor Walz's office knew that MDE had concerns about FOF in April 2020.⁸⁰ He also testified that the Attorney General's Office was notified about these concerns at that time.⁸¹ Governor Walz originally stated he was verbally briefed about suspicious activity in the program in late April or early May 2020, "very early in the program," but the Governor's office subsequently walked this timeline back to November 2020, when FOF first sued MDE.⁸²

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 107.

⁸¹ *Id.*

⁸² Michelle Griffith, *When did Gov. Tim Walz know about the Feeding Our Future fraud?*, MINNESOTA REFORMER (Sept. 30, 2022).

MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q Do you know if the Governor or his staff were briefed by anybody at MDE at the time this draft lawsuit was received?

A Yes. So I would have -- in those regular meetings with the education policy adviser and their education attorney, I would have briefed them on the potential of a lawsuit coming.

Q Did the Attorney General's Office take over the discussions with Feeding Our Future after that draft lawsuit was served?

A I don't think so. Not right away. I notified the assistant attorney general who worked with us on the Partners in Nutrition lawsuit, but I don't think that like we fully turned over communications to like just between attorneys at that point, not yet.

Q And if you remember, would those briefings with Commissioner Ricker or with the Governor's Office, would those have been pretty soon after receiving the draft lawsuit on April 28th, 2020?

A **It's possible, yeah, it's possible that I just said, hey I need time to talk about this right now. It can't wait until our next update.** But if our next update was like the same day or the day after, then maybe I would have waited. I can't really recall.

But, yeah, it's definitely something that would have risen to the level of like, hey, I need a separate meeting on this.

- MDE was having regular discussions about FOF and program irregularities as early as May 2020.⁸³
- MDE contacted the USDA OIG in late 2020 with concerns about FOF, but the OIG did not respond to them.⁸⁴ Emily Honer blamed the USDA OIG's lack of response and intervention for making FOF feel emboldened to commit fraud.⁸⁵

⁸³ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 88 (Feb. 3, 2026).

⁸⁴ Transcribed Interview of Emily Honer, Director of Nutrition Program Services, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 42-43 (Jan. 29, 2026).

⁸⁵ *Id.* at 43.

MDE Director of Nutrition Program Emily Honer (January 29, 2026)

Q I do want to return to USDA IG. You mentioned last hour that you felt like the OIG's response was basically absent. Curious if you wanted to elaborate on that, what you meant?

A Sure. So again, in October, November time frame of 2020 is when the formal complaint was made, which is following the CACFP and other program regulations. When we have concerns, we've used our tools, the next step is to report to the regional office of Inspector General. So we did that, and didn't hear back right away.

But the Office of Inspector General was investigating another case, and I became in a meeting with them in November, December 2020 time frame, and I took that opportunity to again tell my concerns and share the information and share that we needed help.

And I continued to email with the Office of Inspector General, both on the case they were investigating, and on having additional concerns throughout the beginning of 2021 with, again, no investigation, to my knowledge, being started.

Q Do you think that USDA's failure to respond to MDE's questions and concerns in a timely manner accelerated Feeding Our Future's ability to commit fraud?

A Yes, I do.

Q How so?

A **Because the USDA and the Office of Inspector General are supposed to be our final stop when we have used all of our tools. And for that to fail not only allowed Feeding Our Future to continue, but in the matters of the lawsuit that they had against us and USDA refusing to provide support, I feel like it accelerated Feeding Our Future in feeling that they were incredibly powerful.**

- After MDE found FOF in “serious deficiency” in March 2021, MDE placed a stop-pay order against FOF sites. Daron Korte confirmed that MDE had the authority to place a stop-pay order without USDA approval, but MDE, due to their fear of being taken to court, resumed payments to FOF on April 30, 2021.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t of Education, at 89 (Feb. 3, 2026).

MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q And, just to clarify, there would have been no way for MDE to unilaterally make a decision on terminating funds for Feeding our Future.

A I think we could have. You know, we could -- **we could unilaterally make that decision, but we just knew, with Feeding our Future, it was going to end up in court and had the potential to be overturned.** But that is to say, like, we don't need USDA's approval to proceed with termination, is my understanding of how the process works.

2. Department of Human Services

- The Walz Administration knew about fraud in two DHS-administered programs—Child Care Assistance Program and Non-Emergency Medical Transportation—in early 2019.⁸⁷ In his transcribed interview, former DHS Commissioner Tony Lourey also said that he was communicating with Chris Schmitter, Governor Walz's former Chief of Staff, about these concerns in 2019.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Transcribed Interview of Tony Lourey, Former, Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Human Services, at 31-33 (Feb. 6, 2026).

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 40-41.

Former DHS Commissioner Tony Lourey (February 6, 2026).

Q Moving on, you said earlier that you had communicated with Mr. Chris Schmitter?

A Yes.

Q What were the nature of those communications with Mr. Schmitter?

A Primarily updates on negotiations with the budget. Well, and initially crafting the budget -- the Governor's proposed budget -- and then the negotiations of the Governor's proposed budget, and the legislature's pieces that they liked, didn't like, pieces that they added. Primarily budget negotiations.

Q During that time, did you have any conversations -- let me rephrase that. Did you have any communications with Mr. Schmitter regarding fraud or program integrity concerns regarding the medication assisted therapies program, the Nonemergency Medical Transportation program, or the Child Care Assistance Program?

A **To the extent we were working on the program integrity issues, yes, I was communicating with Chris Schmitter about what the proper oversight and tools and authority needed were.**

Q And just to clarify, that would have been in 2019?

A **That would have been in 2019, yes.**

Q Do you know if Mr. Schmitter then briefed the Governor or passed that information along to the Governor about the program integrity or the major program integrity concerns that DHS had at that time?

A I can't speak to conversations that I wasn't involved in.

Q **In your experience as DHS commissioner, and based on what you observed during your time in that role, would you say that concerns about fraud or program integrity at that level would likely have been brought to the Governor's attention?**

A I would say -- you're asking me to speculate.

Q Yes.

A **But I would say that it was likely.**

- Former DHS Commissioner Tony Lourey also testified that Governor Walz knew that the 2019 biennial budget for DHS would not pass if DHS did not address fraud concerns.⁸⁹

Former DHS Commissioner Tony Lourey (February 6, 2026)

Q Did you communicate to Governor Walz or Mr. Schmitter how serious it would be to need -- or the severity of needing to address these fraud concerns in order to get the budget passed?

A You're asking about during my tenure?

Q Yes.

A There was a broad awareness, in order to get a budget through the legislature, these issues needed to have broad bipartisan agreement that we have the tools and authority needed to run programs properly and avoid fraud, yes.

- Since 2019, DHS has had the authority to stop payments to providers it had suspected of fraud.⁹⁰ DHS was never ordered by law enforcement to continue payments to an entity being investigated.⁹¹

Former DHS Commissioner Tony Lourey (February 6, 2026)

Q Was there anything preventing DHS from acting on or addressing concerns about fraud during your time as the commissioner?

A I don't recall barriers that we felt limited us in our ability.

Q Was there anything limiting DHS' ability to initiate a stop pay order, for example, on any providers who you believed to be committing fraud or have serious program integrity issues that you were noticing?

A I -- I don't recall using a stop payment during my tenure, but I believe we had that authority.

- Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead testified that the Walz Administration believed issues related to CCAP fraud were resolved by the time Governor Walz took

⁸⁹ Transcribed Interview of Tony Lourey, Former. Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Human Services, at 43 (Feb. 6, 2026).

⁹⁰ Transcribed Interview of Tony Lourey, Former. Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Human Services, at 60 (Feb. 6, 2026).

⁹¹ Transcribed Interview of Shireen Gandhi, then-Temporary Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Human Services, at 148-150 (Feb. 17, 2026).

office in 2019.⁹² Her testimony is contradicted by two special reports from Minnesota’s OLA that were released during the Walz Administration. The first special report, issued on March 14, 2019, found that “the level of CCAP fraud is more than the \$5 to \$6 million that prosecutors have been able to prove, but we cannot offer a reliable estimate of how much fraud exists in the program.”⁹³ The OLA issued its second special report on April 10, 2019, which concluded that “[w]e found weaknesses in DHS’s program integrity controls and concluded that both DHS and local human services agencies must do more to effectively prevent, detect, and investigate fraud in CCAP.”⁹⁴ Further, an audit released on May 21, 2025 by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of the Inspector General⁹⁵ “revealed that Minnesota did not comply with federal and state attendance documentation requirements for some payments” and “11% of all payments likely had some flaw [] [p]otentially impacting \$23.4 million in child care claims across more than 1,150 providers.”⁹⁶ The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has frozen access to the Child Care and Development Fund due to widespread childcare fraud concerns in Minnesota.⁹⁷

Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead (February 23, 2026)

Q You mentioned several times now that the CCAP issues had taken place before the Walz administration. Was it the Walz administration's understanding that those issues were resolved?

A Pretty much.

Q By the time the Walz administration began in 2019, those issues had been resolved?

A I believe so. **There was one follow-up legislative audit report that confirmed that they were during the Walz administration.**

- Former Commissioner Jodi Harpstead testified in her transcribed interview that DHS had concerns about the EIDBI program in 2023 and that they needed to do more site visits.⁹⁸

⁹² Transcribed Interview of Jodi Harpstead, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t of Hum. Services, at 85-86 (Feb. 23, 2026).

⁹³ MINNESOTA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, CHILDCARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ASSESSMENT OF FRAUD ALLEGATIONS (Mar. 14 2019).

⁹⁴ MINNESOTA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR: CHILD CARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL CONTROLS (Apr. 10, 2019).

⁹⁵ U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT SERIES SRS-A-25-007: AUDITS OF ACCURACY OF CCDF ATTENDANCE RECORDS AT MINNESOTA CHILD CARE CENTERS (May 21, 2025).

⁹⁶ Paul Blume, *Federal audit reveals oversight flaws in Minnesota’s child care payments*, FOX 9 (Dec. 31, 2025).

⁹⁷ Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Freezes Child Care and Family Assistance Grants in Five States for Fraud Concerns (Jan. 6, 2026).

⁹⁸ Transcribed Interview of Jodi Harpstead, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t of Human Services, at 80 (Feb. 23, 2026).

Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead (February 23, 2026)

Q When you caught Mr. Connolly up at the meeting on these issues that DHS had, did any of those conversations involve EIDBI, housing stabilization, Integrated Community Supports?

A Probably EIDBI because we were deciding to go and really take a hard look at those. The Integrated Community Supports concerns and the housing stabilization concerns started bubbling up later.

Q So in 2023, when you hired Mr. Connolly and caught him up to speed, you talked about going after EIDBI?

A Some, yes.

Q Was it specific to doing more site visits or were there other areas in addition to that?

A No. I think when he came on board, we were deep in the middle of the discussion of the Feeding Our Future issues, and it was after that was finished that we decided to turn our attention to visiting the EIDBI providers.

- Only after public criticism that no one in the Walz Administration had been fired for how they've handled fraud and the federal government announced they were investigating Minnesota, Governor Walz proclaimed that "we've fired people who weren't doing their jobs."⁹⁹ In his transcribed interview, the Governor's Chief of Staff from January 2019 to October 2025 could not recall whether the Governor had fired an agency commissioner for their handling of reported fraud concerns. Interestingly, Mr. Schmitter acted like he did not understand this simple question of whether Governor Walz fired, in its common usage, any of the agency commissioners in the cabinet because of their performance handling fraud concerns.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ KSTP 5 Eyewitness News, *Gov. Walz said he's 'fired' people over the fraud crisis. But who?*, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2026), available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8kUTThWMJo>, at 0:35-0:41.

¹⁰⁰ Transcribed Interview of Chris Schmitter, Former Chief of Staff, Office of Governor Tim Walz and Lt. Governor Peggy Flanagan, at 125-26 (Feb. 27, 2026).

Former Governor Walz Chief of Staff Chris Schmitter (February 27, 2026)

Q During your tenure at all, did he [Governor Walz] fire any commissioners for their handling of fraud?

A Say more about what you -- well, say more about what you mean by handling of fraud.

Q During your tenure, did Governor Walz fire a commissioner because he was displeased with their handling of fraud?

A I mean, you know, I described earlier --

Witness Counsel Do you know what she's asking you?

A No.

Q What part of my question do you not understand?

A It's the handling of fraud piece I mentioned earlier. What do you mean by that?

Q You mentioned earlier that there were some discussions about commissioners needing to be more aggressive when it came to handling fraud, that they needed to, you know, put more practices in place to prevent fraud. To your knowledge and during your tenure as Governor Walz' chief of staff, did he fire a commissioner for not being aggressive enough in combatting fraud?

A Well, I think that what I described -- I think that we, for instance, with -- as an example -- **with Commissioner Harpstead, like I said earlier, came to the right result. Like, I think it was right for -- to have a focused conversation about what was needed at the agency and for her to make the decision to leave.**

Q During your tenure as chief of staff, did Governor Walz fire a commissioner for any reason?

A What we talked earlier about Mary Cathryn Ricker, and then, I mean, the -- you know, when the Governor was reelected, he also had to make a decision about whether to ask people to stay on, and so that was a point in which we could kind of assess performance and decide who would stay on into a second term.

Q So during your tenure as chief of staff, yes, Governor Walz did fire commissioners?

A I guess that's -- and maybe I'm sort of struggling with the firing. **We absolutely had commissioners leave, sometimes that was for performance. That is true. Or chose not to reappoint them.**

Preliminary Finding #2:

MDE had authority to unilaterally terminate funding to Feeding Our Future and its participation in federal programs, but MDE chose not to do so out of fear of litigation and being perceived as racist.

- In response to questions about the validity of invoices, in April 2020, FOF's now-convicted founder and executive director Aimee Bock¹⁰¹ threatened MDE with a lawsuit claiming racial discrimination.¹⁰² Bock and FOF filed their lawsuit in Minnesota state court in November 2020, alleging violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act¹⁰³ for MDE's failure to approve FOF applications for new food-distribution sites.¹⁰⁴
- Despite having valid concerns about fraud occurring in the federal nutrition programs and expressing to USDA their support of MDE's refusal to approve the sites, MDE approved these sites anyway because they feared losing the lawsuit and being perceived as racist.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Jury Finds Feeding Our Future Mastermind and Co-Defendant Guilty in \$250 Million Pandemic Fraud Scheme (Mar. 19, 2025); WCCO Staff, *Feeding Our Future Founder Aimee Bock ordered to forfeit \$5.2 million*, CBS NEWS (updated Dec. 31, 2025).

¹⁰² Jonah Kaplan & Joe Walsh, *Everything we know about Minnesota's massive fraud schemes*, CBS NEWS (updated Jan. 5, 2026).

¹⁰³ See generally 2025 Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 363A. Human Rights.

¹⁰⁴ News Release, Minnesota Judicial Branch, *Feeding Our Future v. Minnesota Department of Education: Correcting Media Reports and Statements by Governor Tim Walz Concerning Orders Issued by the Court* (Sept. 23, 2022).

¹⁰⁵ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 107-08 (Feb. 3, 2026).

MDE Assistant Commissioner of MDE Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q On April 29th, 2020, MDE approved the eight sites that were the subject of the draft lawsuit plus four additional sites. Why were these sites approved?

A Again, trying to keep my recollection here of what happened five, six years ago, my recollection was that we had gone to USDA and said we denied these sites. We're getting threatened with a lawsuit here. Can you back us up, basically? Can you provide us something in writing that says that what we're doing is allowable under the Federal regulations so that we can show this to Feeding Our Future and hopefully get them to do what we want them to do without going through a lawsuit. And, again, **I think they were supportive generally of what we were saying we wanted to do, but they weren't willing to provide anything in writing. And we felt like without having that backup from USDA that we just didn't have firm enough ground to stand on to continue to deny those sites in the face of the threatened lawsuit.**

Q But just to clarify, USDA did not affirmatively tell you to approve the sites, though?

A That's correct.

- Assistant Commissioner Korte testified that MDE could have unilaterally terminated funds to FOF without USDA approval, but they were perturbed by the possibility of FOF bringing litigation against them.¹⁰⁶

MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q And, just to clarify, there would have been no way for MDE to unilaterally make a decision on terminating funds for Feeding our Future.

A **I think we could have.** You know, we could - **we could unilaterally make that decision, but we just knew, with Feeding our Future, it was going to end up in court and had the potential to be overturned.** But that is to say, like, **we don't need USDA's approval to proceed- with termination,** is my understanding of how the process works.

¹⁰⁶ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 89 (Feb. 3, 2026).

Preliminary Finding #3:

MDE lacked oversight mechanisms and failed to take responsibility for stopping fraud but instead blamed their inaction on requirements in USDA regulations, blamed Feeding Our Future and the providers it sponsored for perpetuating the fraud, and blamed FOF for hampering them through litigation and accusations of racism.

- MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte explained how MDE relied on “self-attestation” to verify reimbursement submissions for sponsors and providers. FOF, as a sponsor, would be “self-monitoring” its sites and submitting reimbursement requests to MDE. MDE was then responsible for reviewing those requests and acting if they believed that FOF was submitting false claims. This “self-attestation” model is problematic, especially if state agencies are not willing to act, just like MDE.¹⁰⁷

MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q So a little bit earlier you discussed the MDE relied on some potential self-attestation to verify sponsors, providers, or participants. Would you agree with that?

A It's part of the MD - or- the USDA process for sponsorship, yes.

Q Do you believe that self-attestation is an effective method to detect and prevent fraud?

A I would say, on its own, no, but as a part of a larger regulatory scheme, I think that that's one piece where if somebody makes a misstatement or affirms something that isn't true then there can be criminal liability attached to that. So, yeah, I think, again, on its own, it wouldn't be sufficient, but as part of a larger regulatory framework, I can see its purpose.

...

Q At any point, did MDE raise concerns about self-attestation, third-party monitoring, to USDA?

A Well, specifically about - concerns with Feeding Our Future were raised with USDA about those things generally. Outside of the Feeding Our Future context, I'm not sure if those were ever raised with USDA- But, I mean, certainly we had concerns about self-monitoring and self-attestation with Feeding Our Future once we started to see the program irregularities and reported that to USDA.

- MDE consistently blamed lack of support from USDA for not fighting back against FOF litigation, resulting in additional site approvals, not cutting off payments and disenrolling

¹⁰⁷ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 61-62, 63-64 (Feb. 3, 2026).

them from the USDA Federal Nutrition Programs, despite suspicions of fraud.¹⁰⁸ Emily Honer testified in her transcribed interview:

MDE Director of Nutrition Programs Emily Honer (January 29, 2026)

Q And just to clarify, MDE could not terminate funding unilaterally, right? It had to come from USDA?

A Not exactly. So the regulations are very strict for these programs, is that there is a specific way to issue stop payment. Termination under the USDA regulations is a little bit different, meaning the termination of the program itself from that organization.

So the stop pay we have to follow the Federal regulations for.

Q So there's just no way to stop payment without the support of USDA?

A **From their regulations, yes. And the regulations make it incredibly difficult to stop payment.**

In fact, I will say that it is easier for me to take back funds from a childcare provider who uses the wrong kind of rice, than it is to take back or stop payments from an organization I have concerns about.

- MDE had initially denied FOF's enrollment in the CACFP in 2017 because FOF lacked financial viability. Because of the ruling in a separate court case in 2017 about the financial viability of another organization participating in CACFP, MDE felt they did not have the authority to deny FOF's enrollment in this program.¹⁰⁹
- The Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor (OLA) confirmed in its briefing of Committee staff on February 10, 2026, that this lawsuit was purely fact-specific and not precedential.¹¹⁰ Assistant Commissioner Korte also testified that USDA told MDE it was supportive of MDE's determination that Partners in Nutrition lacked financial viability.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Transcribed Interview of Emily Honer, Director of Nutrition Program Services, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 40 (Jan. 29, 2026).

¹⁰⁹ MINNESOTA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: OVERSIGHT OF FEEDING OUR FUTURE, at 24 (June 2024).

¹¹⁰ Briefing by Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, to H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov't Reform Majority and Minority Staff (Feb. 10, 2026).

¹¹¹ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 88 (Feb. 3, 2026).

MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q And was USDA at all responsive to your specific concerns around Feeding our Future and Partners in Nutrition?

A Yes. So, for Partners in Nutrition, they were supportive of our position in terms of, like, our determination of financial viability, they said, "Yup, that's within your jurisdiction as a State to make that determination."

- Former MDE Commissioner Mary Cathryn Ricker testified that MDE staff were not trained to investigate programs for fraud.¹¹²

Former MDE Commissioner Mary Cathryn Ricker (February 5, 2026)

Q Could you provide an example of a complaint or allegation that would have caused MDE to investigate Feeding Our Future?

...

Witness Counsel Do you have a hypothetical you can give her?

A Well -- or like what do you mean by investigate?

People were -- when I think about it, I think of staff at MDE, not just for nutrition, but like staff in, like, the library system and the charter program and others, they were trained to carry out programs. **I don't know that anyone was trained to investigate programs.**

¹¹² Transcribed Interview of Mary Cathryn Ricker, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 81 (Feb. 5, 2026).

Preliminary Finding #4:

Contrary to reports from Governor Walz and in the media, no court in Minnesota ever ordered MDE to resume payments to FOF. After a brief stop-pay order was placed on March 31, 2021, MDE *voluntarily* resumed payments in April 2021, after they were well-aware taxpayer dollars were going to fraud. Taxpayer dollars continued going to FOF until January 2022. Additionally, law enforcement never told MDE to keep payments going to FOF.

- In March 2021, due to MDE declaring that FOF was in “serious deficiency,” MDE stopped payments to FOF and initiated termination proceedings from its CACFP sponsorship.¹¹³ In April 2021, FOF asked the court to order MDE to resume payments and pay sanctions.¹¹⁴ Nine days after an April 21, 2021, hearing in the state court where the judge never ruled on MDE’s stop-pay order, MDE voluntarily removed its stop pay order on FOF.¹¹⁵
- Governor Walz claimed in 2022 that despite his administration identifying fraud, “very early,” “[M]ost of the money left after **we were forced to continue to pay**, not before,” incorrectly indicating that the Ramsey County District Court ordered Minnesota to continue payments to FOF.¹¹⁶ While Attorney General Ellison did not directly claim that the court ordered a removal of MDE’s stop-pay order like Governor Walz did, Ellison still blamed the court’s “contempt order and fines on MDE” about a different issue than the stop-pay order as the reason why Minnesota kept federal funds going to FOF despite MDE’s knowledge of the fraud.¹¹⁷
- In response to the Governor’s statement, Judge Guthmann, who oversaw the case, took the remarkable step of issuing a statement rebutting these claims, saying that he, “**never ordered** the Department of Education to resume payments to FOF in April 2021, or at any other time,” and that, “**all of the Minnesota Department of Education food reimbursements to FOF were made voluntarily, without any court order.**”¹¹⁸ Emily Honer affirmed this in her transcribed interview.¹¹⁹

¹¹³ MINNESOTA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: OVERSIGHT OF FEEDING OUR FUTURE, at 88 (June 2024).

¹¹⁴ *Id.* at 89.

¹¹⁵ *Id.*

¹¹⁶ Gov. Tim Walz pushes back against food fraud criticism, CBS NEWS (Sept. 22, 2022).

¹¹⁷ Keith Ellison, Attorney General Ellison: My meeting before Feeding Our Future raid was routine, MINNESOTA STAR TRIBUNE (APR. 21, 2025).

¹¹⁸ News Release, Minnesota Judicial Branch, Feeding Our Future v. Minnesota Department of Education: Correcting Media Reports and Statements by Governor Tim Walz Concerning Orders Issued by the Court (Sept. 23, 2022) (emphasis added).

¹¹⁹ Transcribed Interview of Emily Honer, Director of Director of Nutrition Programs, Minnesota Dep’t of Education, at 122 (Jan. 29, 2026).

MDE Director of Nutrition Programs Emily Honer (January 29, 2026)

Q So, on April 13th, 2021, Feeding Our Future filed another motion in Ramsey County District Court.

Were you familiar with the second phase of this lawsuit around this time?

A Not that I can specifically remember, but I feel like I was involved with the lawsuit.

Q Do you know if it was about MDE's decision to stop payment?

A Not that I can specifically remember, but it could have been because of the timeframe.

Q Do you remember if the judge actually issued a final ruling in that case?

A The judge -- and I just want to clarify if you are still speaking to the stop-pay issue. Right?

Q Yes.

A **So it's my understanding that the judge did not make a final ruling on the stop-pay.**

Q And with the stop-pay, the court determined that that was actually outside the jurisdiction. Does that sound right to you?

A That sounds correct.

- Assistant Commissioner Korte testified that while MDE had concerns about FOF's growth, MDE decided to wait for the FBI to announce charges against FOF before terminating their participation as a sponsor of federal nutrition programs.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Education, at 88-89 (Feb. 3, 2026).

MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q I'll ask another. So, after MDE expressed to USDA that Feeding our Future should be terminated from funds, what was USDA's response?

A I guess it depends on what the timeframe was because, you know, for a long time, it was just raising concerns and trying to figure out what our parameters were to kind of slow down the growth of their program. But then, once it got to the point where we knew that the FBI was involved, we knew that the U.S. Attorney's Office was involved, you know, any move to terminate them at that point would have jeopardized - potentially jeopardized the investigation. **And so we were basically waiting- and saying, "Okay. Like, FBI's going to come in. They're going to serve search warrants. We're going to have the evidence we need to shut them down now." And we didn't know if that was going to happen in 2 weeks or 2 months, and it ended up being 8 months.** So, I mean, in terms of the termination, we didn't really get to that part of the conversation until - like I said, that I can -recall - until- after the search warrants were issued.

- During this eight-month period, hundreds of millions of federal dollars were paid to FOF.¹²¹ MDE also permitted FOF to participate in the USDA's Summer Food Service Program during this period, greatly expanding their avenues for fraud.¹²²
- Governor Walz claimed that his administration was unable to stop payments because the FBI instructed them not to do anything that could jeopardize the investigation.¹²³ However, Assistant Commissioner Korte testified that the FBI never told MDE to resume payments to Feeding Our Future.¹²⁴

MDE Assistant Commissioner Daron Korte (February 3, 2026)

Q Did the FBI ever tell you or anybody else at MDE to resume payments to Feeding Our Future?

A **No.**

¹²¹ Affidavit of Jared F. Kary in Support of an Application under Rule 41 for a Warrant to Search and Seize, *In re Search of the Business Office Located at 9217 17th Avenue South, Suite 203 Bloomington, Minnesota as Described in Attachment A*, No. 25-mj-861 (DTS) (D. Minnesota. Dec. 18, 2025), available at <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20260107/118796/HHRG-119-GO00-20260107-SD071.pdf>, at 5.

¹²² MINNESOTA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: OVERSIGHT OF FEEDING OUR FUTURE, at 91 (June 2024).

¹²³ CBS, *Gov. Tim Walz pushes back against food fraud criticism*, CBS NEWS (Sept. 22, 2022).

¹²⁴ Transcribed Interview of Daron Korte, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Education, at 133 (Feb. 3, 2026).

Preliminary Finding #5:

DHS lacked oversight mechanisms, sufficient internal controls and failed to take responsibility for stopping fraud. Additionally, in certain programs, DHS ignored its program’s integrity responsibilities because of “pressure” to get money out the door.

- Former Commissioner Jodi Harpstead confirmed that DHS made decisions to get money out the door quickly because “there was always pressure to get the money out and make sure that we were spending the money that had been appropriated.”¹²⁵ DHS needed to spend the money to further justify continued appropriation levels.
- Minnesota has applied for and received numerous Home and Community Based Services (HCBS) waivers for its Medicaid funded programs, including for HSS, EIDBI, and ICS, which allows the state to meet the needs of people who prefer to get long-term care services and supports in their home or community, rather than in an institutional setting.¹²⁶ According to CMS regulations, initial eligibility determinations for Medicaid programs authorized under HCBS waivers must be conducted by an independent entity, separate from the provider of direct services.¹²⁷ If the state makes an exception to the eligibility determination regulations, it must implement strict conflict of interest protections.¹²⁸ During his transcribed interview, Eric Grumdahl testified that DHS did not always follow the CMS eligibility regulations, creating exceptions by allowing the same entity that delivered the assessment to also provide services, which resulted in program integrity issues.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Transcribed Interview of Jodi Harpstead, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t of Human Services, at 36 (Feb. 23, 2026).

¹²⁶ *Home & Community Based Services Authorities, 1915(c)*, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (last visited Feb. 28, 2026), available at <https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/home-community-based-services/authorities/home-community-based-services-1915c>; *Medicaid, Home & Community Based Services Authorities 1915(i)*, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (last visited Feb. 28, 2026), available at <https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/home-community-based-services/home-community-based-services-authorities/home-community-based-services-1915i>.

¹²⁷ 42 C.F.R. § 441.730 (2026).

¹²⁸ 42 C.F.R. § 441.300 (2026).

¹²⁹ Transcribed Interview of Eric Grumdahl, Former Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t Hum. Services, at 132-33 (Feb. 12, 2026).

Former DHS Assistant Commissioner Eric Grumdahl (February 12, 2026)

Q Were there any examples of these entities that were submitting this eligibility plan being connected to or the same entities that would provide housing for these individuals?

A So, under Medicaid regs -- under Medicaid regulations, in general, that assessment function for a home- and community-based service needs to be different from the ongoing service provider.

There are exceptions in places where there simply aren't two providers that are operating or there are services that are being delivered in a culturally specific way that we don't have two different providers in the same area that can do that service. There are exceptions that DHS could authorize to say, we're going to let the same entity that delivered the assessment also deliver the ongoing service.

But, in general, those were two different entities.

And I think part of what the ongoing analysis of the program has been, the extent to which that was one of the vectors that was used to raise concerns about program integrity.

Q So DHS did authorize in specific areas these verifying entities who were also providing housing services?

A Yeah, it was -- I would say that's a limited -- I don't know the total number of cases where that happened, but that was a small percentage of the total program.

Q Do you know which areas or communities these entities operated in?

A I don't. I suspect it's, you know, to some degree statewide, but I don't know.

- Former Assistant Commissioner Grumdahl testified that he had conversations about HSS program integrity concerns with DHS Commissioner Harpstead in 2022 and 2023.¹³⁰ Despite this, Mr. Grumdahl told the Committee the only legislative steps his team took to address HSS program integrity concerns occurred during the 2025 legislative session.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Transcribed Interview of Eric Grumdahl, Former Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't Hum. Services, at 20-21 (Feb. 12, 2026).

¹³¹ *Id.* at 135-36.

Former DHS Assistant Commissioner Eric Grumdahl (February 12, 2026)

Q And do you remember when the first conversation would have occurred regarding fraud or program integrity concerns within your jurisdiction at DHS?

Q Would that have been 2022?

A I wouldn't feel confident pinning it to -- because I, you know, started in August of 2022. **I don't know if it would have been 2022 or into 2023, but I'm certain within those 2 years.**

...

Q What kind of recommendations, if any, would you make about HSS concerns?

A So, you know, a lot of the strategies to strengthen **HSS's program integrity were ones that my team and I helped develop as part of the 2025 legislative session.** I was involved, as I mentioned earlier, in the agency's consideration of elevating the risk level for the program from limited risk to high risk. And so, a lot of places where my team had input and provided guidance or feedback or suggestions.

- DHS had direct knowledge of forgery in the HSS program in 2022 or 2023.¹³² Instead of acting on these serious indications of fraud through a stop-payment or provider termination, DHS did nothing until it was too late. In 2025, DHS elevated the risk level for HSS,¹³³ just months before the HSS Program was terminated for “insufficient controls to prevent bad actors from accessing funding.”¹³⁴

Former DHS Assistant Commissioner Eric Grumdahl (February 12, 2026)

Q Can you provide an example of some of those early concerns that you were raising to your superiors?

A Sure.

Q In any role you had at DHS.

A Sure. Yeah. This likely would have been in my initial role at the agency. I think as we heard concerns about specific providers that were submitting claims that didn't -- or submitting -- more often my team would have visibility into applications that were being submitted on behalf of somebody to establish their eligibility for Housing Stabilization Services.

I remember one instance -- I don't remember the exact timing of this, but I remember one instance where **my team identified some irregularities in the paperwork that raised questions about whether they had been forged.** And so those would be the kinds of things that, in addition to the report of the Office of Inspector General, I imagine that I briefed Commissioner Harpstead about those details. I don't remember the specific conversation or the timing, but that's the kind of thing that I would lift up as an example.

Q What were some of those irregularities that you were seeing on the paperwork?

A **Signatures validating somebody's needs that didn't appear to kind of align with what would have been possible for those signatures to have been completed.** I wouldn't want to specify on the record too many details about that because this is an area of ongoing investigation.

¹³² *Id.* at 21-22.

¹³³ *Id.* at 39.

¹³⁴ MPR News Staff, *Minnesota moves to end housing stabilization program after reports of possible fraud*, MPR NEWS (Aug. 1, 2025).

- Then Temporary Commissioner Gandhi tried to blame the Minnesota Legislature for HSS licensure issues. However, when pressed about when DHS raised fraud or program integrity concerns to the legislature, she denied any knowledge about the HSS Program licensure protocols prior to her appointment as Temporary Commissioner.¹³⁵

Then DHS Temporary Commissioner Shireen Gandhi (February 17, 2026)

Q Did DHS allow providers in Housing Stabilization Services program to be unlicensed?

A The decision is with the legislature. So the legislature, my understanding, sets the parameters for whether a program is licensed or unlicensed. That requires funding, staffing, structure, et cetera, when the legislature sets our budget and staffing.

...

Q Did DHS, at any point since this program's design, raise concerns to the legislature that providers not needing a license to participate in this program left it more susceptible to fraud?

A **I wouldn't I didn't have knowledge of that before being put into this role of temporary commissioner.** I know that as a matter of course, routinely, DHS has gone back with program enhancements and strengthening program integrity measures in many programs. Whether that was one of them or not I don't know because I wasn't involved in it.

¹³⁵ Transcribed Interview of Shireen Gandhi, then Temporary Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Hum. Services, at 160-61 (Feb. 17, 2026).

- Then Temporary DHS Commissioner Shireen Gandhi was unable to answer if DHS had a mechanism for ensuring that children enrolled in the EIDBI program actually have autism.¹³⁶

Then DHS Temporary Commissioner Shireen Gandhi (February 17, 2026)

Q The first charge brought by the USAO for Minnesota in the EIDBI program said that the individual that they were charging ran an organization providing services to children with autism. And part of the charge was that this individual was arranging for diagnoses of autism for children who actually did not have autism.

Are you concerned at all that some of these diagnoses are being falsified by providers in order to obtain more Medicaid reimbursements for this program?

A Yeah, that -- I mean, that's a very concerning claim and very upsetting if that's happening. And I think, as always, we have to look at the fraud schemes that are out there and make sure we're putting whatever measures we can in place to guard against that type of fraud.

Q And does DHS have a way of verifying that the autism diagnosis of a recipient of these services is legitimate?

A **I would need to -- I don't know specifically how our program area, all the checks and balances of the diagnoses, but needs, whatever it is, needs to be continually evaluated based on what we are seeing in terms of fraudulent activity.**

So if what we are doing now is not sufficient, we up it, and if that's not sufficient, we up it again.

¹³⁶ *Id.* at 168.

Preliminary Finding #6:

DHS could unilaterally place a stop-payment against providers they suspected of credible fraud allegations. However, DHS failed to act for years after receiving credible allegations of fraud. Governor Walz's hand-picked DHS Commissioner, who served from 2019-2025, did not feel she was qualified to take on fraud; these programs were increasingly defrauded during her tenure.

- Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead testified that in 2023, in coordination with the Governor's office, DHS decided to cut off all funding to individuals indicted in the FOF case who were enrolled in DHS-administered programs, even though they did not discover any evidence that they had been defrauding DHS programs.¹³⁷

Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead (February 23, 2026)

Q Ms. Harpstead, I just want to take a step back here. Earlier you had mentioned that there were, to your understanding, some sort of connections between the Feeding Our Future indictments and some programs at DHS. Can you just generally describe, to the best of your recollection, what that situation looked like and what happened?

A After Feeding Our Future happened, we wanted to be sure we understood whether there was any connection between people indicted and Feeding Our Future and DHS services, and we found people who were providing services for DHS who had been indicted in Feeding Our Future.

So we went through -- we went through the court records from the Feeding Our Future work in collaboration with the Attorney General's office. We looked at every Child Care Assistance Program dollar, every Medicaid dollar, every grant that they might have been involved with to see what their involvement was. We found zero fraud in DHS by the people that had been indicted in Feeding Our Future. **But because of the preponderance of evidence in the court records, we did disqualify individuals from working in DHS programs for 15 years, and we stopped payment in some of the organizations.**

¹³⁷ Transcribed Interview of Jodi Harpstead, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Hum. Services, at 14-15 (Feb. 23, 2026).

- Then Temporary Commissioner Shireen Gandhi confirmed that the DHS Commissioner has the authority to stop payment whenever a credible allegation of fraud is found.¹³⁸

Then Temporary DHS Commissioner Shireen Gandhi (February 17, 2026)

Q Are you aware of anything that prevented DHS from stopping payment to providers when a credible allegation of fraud was found?

A **I am not aware of anything.**

Q Were there any steps you had to take once a credible allegation of fraud was found in order to stop payment? Did it have to be approved by any sort of division within DHS? Outside of DHS?

A That authority rests with the Inspector General, and the Inspector General does not need the approval of anybody.

Q Could the commissioner veto any decision from the Inspector General along those lines?

A **The authority actually rests with the commissioner, as it is in statute right now. But I have given a delegation to the Inspector General to make that decision.** And to my knowledge, I was following the past practice of the previous commissioner who also had delegated that authority to the Inspector General.

- Then Temporary Commissioner Shireen Gandhi confirmed that DHS has made only \$50 million in Medicaid recoveries over the past 5 years.¹³⁹

Then Temporary DHS Commissioner Shireen Gandhi (February 17, 2026)

Q Do you know what the recoveries look like for overpayment with the ICS program?

A I do not know what recoveries look like for the ICS program. I know over the past 5 years DHS has about \$50 million in recoveries across numerous programs in Medicaid.

- In February 2026, the DOJ charged the 79th defendant in connection to the Feeding Our Future fraud scheme.¹⁴⁰ This defendant operated a child care center licensed with DHS,

¹³⁸ Transcribed Interview of Shireen Gandhi, then Temporary Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't Hum. Services, at 95 (Feb. 17, 2026).

¹³⁹ *Id.* at 170.

¹⁴⁰ Soyoung Kim, *Feeding our future: 79th person charged*, FOX 9 (Feb. 19, 2026).

which in 2018 became a sponsor under Feeding Our Future and claimed \$850,000 in reimbursements from December 2020 to July 2021, spending only a fraction on children.¹⁴¹ This child care center received \$3.67 million in CCAP funding in 2025 alone.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ *Id.*

¹⁴² David Lindfield, *Somali Fraudster Arrested for Stealing Millions for Taxpayers in Minnesota*, SLAY NEWS (Feb. 19, 2026).

Preliminary Finding #7:

DHS officials consistently “passed the buck” and abdicated responsibility for investigating and determining fraud to the Office of Inspector General or the Division of Internal Audit, despite both of those being direct reports to the DHS Commissioner, a position appointed by Governor Walz. Commissioner Harpstead, who Governor Walz appointed in 2019, did not feel she was qualified to take on fraud.

- When Committee staff questioned Mr. Grumdahl about recent guilty pleas related to fraud in the HSS program that federal prosecutors have characterized as “fraud tourism,”¹⁴³ he deflected knowledge by pointing to the Office of Inspector General and the DHS fraud hotline.¹⁴⁴

Former DHS Assistant Commissioner Eric Grumdahl (February 12, 2026)

Q Were you aware of any instances of providers traveling from other States to Minnesota to participate in the HSS program?

A Not prior to recent coverage of that.

Q What knowledge do you have of that recent coverage?

A I am aware that two individuals, I believe based out of Philadelphia, have been charged and have pleaded guilty, I believe, to defrauding the program.

Q Okay. So I think we're talking about the same thing then.

A Okay.

So, again, when my team or other entities managed care organizations, other community partners again, **DHS's, kind of, fraud hotline is available to anybody to report. When those reports go in, the process of having them be investigated is really handled within the Office of Inspector General, not something that my team has visibility or involvement in.**

- Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead stated that fraud in the CCAP program was resolved prior to her appointment.¹⁴⁵ When questioned by Committee staff about this statement, Ms. Harpstead testified that former Deputy Commissioner Chuck Johnson,

¹⁴³ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Fraud Tourists Plead Guilty to Minneapolis Medicaid Fraud (Feb. 10, 2026).

¹⁴⁴ Transcribed Interview of Eric Grumdahl, Former Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t Hum. Services, at 136-37 (Feb. 12, 2026).

¹⁴⁵ Transcribed Interview of Jodi Harpstead, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t Hum. Services, at 87-88 (Feb. 23, 2026).

who oversaw the DHS OIG, told her it [CCAP] was “[] cleaned up and done.”¹⁴⁶ However, according to public news reports in January 2025, the DHS OIG had 62 open investigations into CCAP day care centers across the state.¹⁴⁷ Further, some of these day care centers were “receiving millions of dollars in CCAP money even though they had repeat violations, many of them which could threaten the health and safety of children, over multiple years.”¹⁴⁸ One investigation involved Quality Learning Center, an entity that received \$7.8 million in federal funds despite having 95 violations between 2019 and 2023.¹⁴⁹ Recent public reporting has revealed that significant fraud concerns are still present.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ *Id.*

¹⁴⁷ Jay Kolls, *62 investigations underway involving federally-funded Minnesota child care centers*, KSTP (Jan. 28, 2025).

¹⁴⁸ *Id.*

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ See, e.g., Olivia Prondzinski, *Federal audit finds flaws in Minnesota Child Care Assistance Program attendance reporting*, KTTC (Jan. 1, 2026).

Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead (February 23, 2026)

Q So did anyone in the Governor's office or the Governor himself tell you or brief you about CCAP when you took your role as DHS commissioner?

A No. I probably got that story mostly from our deputy commissioner.

Q And what deputy commissioner?

A Chuck Johnson who'd been there before me.

Q And what did Chuck tell you about CCAP when you assumed your role as DHS commissioner?

A **That there had been some fraud, and there was a process that they went through and took care of it, cleaned it up, and done.**

Q So during your entire tenure as DHS commissioner, are you aware of any actions the DHS took to address CCAP fraud?

A Not specifically. There may have been specific providers that our OIG's office dealt with. The more recent things that I'm seeing in the newspaper about CCAP didn't happen while I was there, or the discussion -- public discussion of them did not happen while I was there.

Q **Did you receive any reports from the OIG's office, from Chuck Johnson, or his replacement, about investigations that the DHS OIG had opened with respect to CCAP?**

A No.

- Former DHS Commissioner Harpstead also denied any knowledge about a tipline housed in the Office of Inspector General.¹⁵¹ This allowed Ms. Harpstead to point at DHS Deputy Director Chuck Johnson for her failure to recall or act on tips about fraud or program integrity throughout her tenure.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Transcribed Interview of Jodi Harpstead, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't Hum. Services, at 54-55 (Feb. 23, 2026).

¹⁵² *Id.*

Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead (February 23, 2026)

Q Was there a hotline or a tip line in the DHS OIG office?

A I'm not sure. I'm not sure. I know they got a lot of tips, but I don't know if there was a specific central location for those.

Q So during your time as DHS commissioner you were never aware of a DHS OIG hotline or tip line?

A No. I just heard about a lot of tips.

Q Within the DHS OIG's office, Chuck Johnson would have reported those tips to you?

A Not usually. They just took care of them most of the time.

Q So how did you hear about a lot of tips from the DHS OIG's office?

A Well, sometimes when something got to be a big deal and they were going to ask me about it at the legislature or whatever, they would give me a briefing on the whole thing. And it all started with this tip we got, and that's how I got it.

- Then Temporary Commissioner Shireen Ghandi also attempted to blame her oversight and program integrity failures on the hotline in the Office of the Inspector General.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ Transcribed Interview of Shireen Gandhi, then Temporary Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't Hum. Services, at 45-46 (Feb. 17, 2026).

Then DHS Temporary Commissioner Shireen Gandhi (February 17, 2026)

Q So who answers that fraud line or tip line? Do you know?

A I know the office that answers it. We have two. One is answered by the Office of Inspector General, and the other is answered by the internal audit division.

...

A To my knowledge, both functions have had a way for people to report concerns to them.

Q Do you know if those tips are recorded on that line? Or are they erased? How does that work?

A I don't know.

Q Who would know?

A The Office of Inspector General staff, and the internal auditor, if you're asking about the internal audit line.

Q Do you know whether those calls are verified by an independent third party?

A I'm not clear on that question.

Q Does anyone outside of DHS listen to or review the calls from the tip line?

A I am not aware if that's a general practice, if that's your question. Currently, our Office of Inspector General is working with an outside vendor on tip line backlog and process going forward.

Q So is that -- so the tip line backlog, is that something you encountered when you stepped into your role as temporary commissioner?

A It's something I became aware of.

Q Something you became aware of. What did you learn about the hotline/tip line backlog when you stepped into your role as temporary commissioner?

A That there was one, and that the team reviews and screens tips to work on those that are most actionable first, and that they are working on clearing the backlog and putting improved processes in place to handle the volume of calls and tips they get.

- Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead resigned from her position in February 2025 because she felt she was not equipped to lead an agency more focused on fraud prevention.¹⁵⁴

Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead (February 23, 2026)

Q What were the circumstances around your departure?

A I decided to leave as -- after we had given the Governor the fraud package for his budget and it was clear that we were going to need to turn more attention to that issue, I talked to the Governor's team one day and said that I'm not sure I'm the best person to take it from here. I did not have a background in fraud. I was not a lawyer. It wasn't my background or my career. And I had been hired for being able to manage a large organization and innovation and understanding human services, and we're getting into a space that was not my forte and thought I should probably step away. And then I thought about it longer and finally decided that I would, so I stepped away myself February 3rd.

¹⁵⁴ Transcribed Interview of Jodi Harpstead, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't of Hum. Services, at 133 (Feb. 23, 2026).

Preliminary Finding #8:

Whistleblowers claim they experienced retaliation for reporting waste, fraud, and abuse. Whistleblowers had concerns that when they reported fraud issues to the Office of Internal Audit or the DHS OIG, it would automatically go to the Commissioner or Human Resources.

- Whistleblowers within the DHS have alleged that Governor Walz not only knew about this fraud, but that he retaliated against whistleblowers, “spen[ding] millions on surveilling staff and hiring private investigator (sic) or law firms to silence staff.”¹⁵⁵ Then Temporary DHS Commissioner Shireen Gandhi confirmed that DHS used outside entities to investigate DHS staff in her transcribed interview.¹⁵⁶

Then DHS Temporary Commissioner Shireen Gandhi (February 17, 2026)

Q Well, I guess we can ask about -- well, does DHS investigate employees in any other context aside from HR investigations?

A I don't think so.

Then in that case, does DHS contract with outside entities to conduct those investigations, or is that all done in-house?

A I believe that it happens both ways.

...

Q Are you aware of DHS hiring any outside law firms to investigate employees?

A Whether the outside investigators are attorneys or not, they may be. I don't know.

- Dozens of whistleblowers also reported that they were told not to say anything about the fraud because they would be called “racist” or “Islamophobic” or that it would hurt the state.¹⁵⁷ While the Minnesota Fraud Committee has been frank that the vast majority of the fraud has been committed by members of the Somali community, “some of [their] best whistleblowers are also in the Somali community.”¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Minnesota Staff Fraud Reporting Commentary (@Minnesota_DHS), X, (Dec. 31, 2025, 12:17 PM), available at https://x.com/Minnesota_DHS/status/2006414535486320779.

¹⁵⁶ Transcribed Interview of Shireen Gandhi, then Temporary Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t of Hum. Services, at 136-37 (Feb. 17, 2026).

¹⁵⁷ Eric Daugherty (@EricLDaugh), X, (Dec. 30, 2025, 2:46 PM), available at <https://x.com/EricLDaugh/status/2006089448409157860>.

¹⁵⁸ *Id.*

- Critics have highlighted that mainstream local media has avoided holding elected officials accountable for enabling fraud for fear of being accused of being racist.¹⁵⁹ The Minnesota Star Tribune, which is largest newspaper in the state, has been particularly hesitant to call out Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison for enabling this fraud crisis.¹⁶⁰ The Star Tribune’s CEO, Steve Grove, previously served in the Walz Administration as former Commissioner of the Department of Employment and Economic Development,¹⁶¹ which is a cabinet-level, Governor-appointed position.¹⁶² National mainstream media has also sought to discredit Nick Shirley’s viral video highlighting daycare fraud.¹⁶³
- Then Temporary Commissioner Shireen Gandhi confirmed whistleblower reports that DHS upper management would regularly meet, or “check-in,” with employees who have reported fraud concerns.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Anrew Mark Miller, *Media ‘complicity’ blamed as feds say Minnesota fraud crisis could reach \$9B: ‘Shown their true colors’*, FOX NEWS (Dec. 21, 2025).

¹⁶⁰ *Id.*

¹⁶¹ *Id.*

¹⁶² *Governor’s Cabinet*, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR TIM WALZ & LT. GOVERNOR PEGGY FLANAGAN (last visited Jan. 2, 2026), available at <https://mn.gov/governor/about-gov/governors-cabinet/>.

¹⁶³ Lindsay Kornick, *Nick Shirley responds to CNN ‘hit piece’ on his Minnesota fraud investigation*, FOX NEWS (Jan. 1, 2026).

¹⁶⁴ Transcribed Interview of Shireen Gandhi, then Temporary Commissioner, Minnesota Dep’t Hum. Services, at 119-20 (Feb. 17, 2026).

Then DHS Temporary Commissioner Shireen Gandhi (February 17, 2026)

A Of an employee that I met with about fraud concerns. I am aware of Faye Bernstein, who reported fraud concerns, and interacted with her after the fact. I did not have direct interaction with her when she initially reported the concerns.

Q When was this?

A Sometime when I was chief compliance officer, so 2019 maybe, 2018, 2019.

Q So what was the nature of you meeting with Ms. Bernstein? Were you asked to do this? Did you do this on your own?

A What I recall -- and this is some time ago -- but what I recall is that when Faye was coming back from investigatory leave, she came into the contracts and legal compliance division. I welcomed the additional staff because our contracts and legal compliance division was stretched thin with the number of contracts that we had. In addition, Faye shared concerns with me that she felt were still not resolved, and so, I took each of those concerns and worked them through to the end, sharing with her what I learned each step of the way until, you know, each matter was addressed or taken to its natural conclusion.

Q What were some of those concerns she shared with you?

A I knew you were going to ask me that. I can't -- I can't recall exactly, but, you know, AMHI grants were one of them. It was, you know, just, you know, good questions, good concerns that she wanted addressed, and as chief compliance officer, I made sure whoever needed to looked into them, and we either resolved them or realized it wasn't an issue, or the information she had been given by somebody else was wrong, you know, whatever it was.

- Former Commissioner Jodi Harpstead confirmed whistleblower reports that a group of DHS employees was sending emails to DHS upper management and Chris Schmitter, Governor Walz's then-Chief of Staff, to let them know about fraud concerns. It was clear from Harpstead's disdain towards this group that DHS upper management was not fond of employees who raised concerns about fraud and how management was handling it.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ Transcribed Interview of Jodi Harpstead, Former Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't Hum. Services, at 88-90 (Feb. 23, 2026).

Former DHS Commissioner Jodi Harpstead (February 23, 2026)

Q Did he [Chris Schmitter] talk to you about any reports that he would have received from DHS employees about your performance?

A We had the group of concerned employees that were sending emails around that he would have talked to me about.

Q Could you expand on that? What do you mean?

A There was a group of employees that were sending around emails, raising concerns, a variety of different concerns in the Behavioral Health Administration, and he was getting them too.

Q What were those concerns?

A Oh, they were all over the map, lots of different things. Sometimes they were about concerns about providers and how things were going and whatnot. While I was tracking them, we found no substantial issues that we needed to deal with. They were also copying Office of the Legislative Auditor, and she wasn't finding anything in them either.

Q So, like, were they claiming that fraud was going on with providers? Like, could you be more specific?

A They were complaining about management, their management. They were complaining about -- they were complaining about their fellow employees, ways they were very disrespectful, and was kind -- it was kind of all over the place, not any specific reports that led to investigations or prosecutions.

...

Q What were they saying?

A I don't know. Just random comments about management this and management that.

...

Q Like were they alleging like retaliation-type issues, or interpersonal employee issues, like can you be more specific?

A There were concerns raised about managers retaliating in general. There weren't as many about me as there were about whoever they reported to.

...

Q Anybody specific?

A And Chris Schmitter was mentioned, too, and Shireen, and others.

- Former Assistant Commissioner Grumdahl testified that a member of his team, Emmanuel Nwala, had sent an email about wanting to surveil DHS employees who were critical of leadership.¹⁶⁶

Former DHS Assistant Commissioner Eric Grumdahl (February 12, 2026)

Q Are you aware of instances of DHS leadership seeking to find the locations of employees who are sending emails that are critical of DHS leadership?

A So I'm aware of an email that one colleague sent indicating a desire to identify individuals using their IP addresses, and as a result of that, he was told not to engage in that way or to engage in that way with that group of individuals that were reporting concerns.

Q Which colleague was this?

A This is Emmanuel Nwala.

...

Q Did you receive the email that he sent?

A I did.

...

A -- I can recall the fine details. But Emmanuel and other staff had been personally targeted by a group of individuals that were kind of communicating anonymously and raising concerns but also delivering some really scathing and hurtful messages to select staff, including Emmanuel, and he responded indicating that he was going to leverage some previous experience to be able to locate who was sending these messages. And I followed up with him and indicated to him that that was not helpful or appropriate and that I didn't want him to be doing that in the future.

...

Q When you say previous experience, what does that mean?

A I think that was the language that he used, but he talked about some of his previous experience in the military and being able to leverage some kind of military intelligence to be able to identify who was sending those messages.

¹⁶⁶ Transcribed Interview of Eric Grumdahl, Former Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Dep't Hum. Services, at 108-11 (Feb. 12, 2026). A screenshot of the email Nwala sent can be found on X. Minnesota Staff Fraud Reporting Commentary (@Minnesota_DHS), X, (Nov. 10, 2023, 4:09 PM), *available at* https://x.com/Minnesota_DHS/status/1723085447524454535.

Conclusion

While the Committee continues to review documents and meet with whistleblowers, it is evident that Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison knew about the fraud in federal programs administered by the State of Minnesota much earlier than they told the American people. Transcribed interviews with current and former public officials from the State of Minnesota have confirmed that Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison would have been aware of fraud in the CCAP and high-risk Medicaid programs administered by DHS as early as spring 2019 and fraud in the CACFP and SFSP programs administered by MDE as early as April 2020. The federal government has determined that at least \$300 million was stolen by Feeding Our Future and its affiliated vendors and providers. Federal prosecutors estimate that \$9 billion has gone to fraud from the high-risk Medicaid programs in Minnesota since 2018. The Committee has found that Minnesota lacked adequate oversight efforts to verify that taxpayer dollars were being used appropriately and could have stopped the flow of money to fraudsters at any time but chose not to for fear of political retribution from the politically active Somali community. Further legislative efforts at the federal level are necessary to prevent this massive waste, fraud, and abuse of federal dollars from ever happening again.

Appendix

On December 3, 2025, Chairman Comer sent two requests, one to Governor Tim Walz and Governor and another to Attorney General Keith Ellison, for all documents and communications pertaining to the Feeding Our Future fraud within MDE and fraud within DHS-administered Medicaid programs, as well as documents, records, and communications related to remittances paid to Somalia sourced from fraudulent activity. As of the release of this initial report, Minnesota Solicitor General, on behalf of Governor Walz and, Attorney General Ellison’s office have responded with two document productions, respectively.

Documents Requested	Produced - ✓ (yes) or X (no)
<p>Walz: All documents and communications between or including the State of Minnesota Department of Human Services and the Office of Governor Tim Walz and Lieutenant Governor Peggy Flanagan concerning the Feeding Our Future program including but not limited to Safari Restaurant, Empire Cuisine and Market LLC, S & S Catering Inc., Haji’s Kitchen LLC, Community Enhancement Services Inc., and Brava Restaurant & Café LLC.</p>	<p>X</p>
<p>Walz: All documents and communications between or including the State of Minnesota Department of Human Services and the Office of Governor Tim Walz and Lieutenant Governor Peggy Flanagan concerning Minnesota’s Housing Stability Services Program including but not limited to Brilliant Minds Services LLC, Faladcare Inc., Leo Human Services LLC, and Liberty Plus LLC.</p>	<p>X</p>
<p>Walz: All documents and communications between or including the State of Minnesota Department of Human Services and the Office of Governor Tim Walz and Lieutenant Governor Peggy Flanagan concerning the EIDBI Autism Program including but not limited to Smart Therapy LLC and Asha Farhan Hassan; and</p>	<p>X</p>
<p>Walz: All documents, records, and communications from the Minnesota Department of Commerce from the period of January 1, 2014 to the present related to any complaints and/or occurrences of remittance payments to Somalia sourced from fraudulent</p>	<p>X</p>

<p>activity, including but not limited to the individuals charged in the Feeding Our Future fraud case.</p>	
<p>Ellison: All documents and communications between or including the Minnesota AG’s Office and the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (“MCFU”) or any relevant state agency related to all reports and audits about the Feeding our Future fraud scheme including but not limited to Safari Restaurant, Empire Cuisine and Market LLC, S & S Catering Inc., Haji’s Kitchen LLC, Community Enhancement Services Inc., and Brava Restaurant & Café LLC</p>	<p>X</p>
<p>Ellison: All documents and communications between or including the Minnesota AG’s Office and the MFCU or any relevant state agency related to all reports and audits about the Housing Stability Services Program including but not limited to Brilliant Minds Services LLC, Faladcare Inc., Leo Human Services LLC, and Liberty Plus LLC</p>	<p>Claims that the Minnesota Attorney General cannot produce because those documents are privileged, non-public, and part of an ongoing investigation.</p>
<p>Ellison: All documents and communications between or including the Minnesota AG’s Office and the MCFU or any relevant state agency related to all reports and audits about the EIDBI Autism Program including but not limited to Smart Therapy LLC and Asha Farhan Hassan</p>	<p>Claims that the Minnesota Attorney General cannot produce because those documents are privileged, non-public, and part of an ongoing investigation.</p>
<p>Ellison: All documents, records, and communications from the Minnesota Department of Commerce from the period of January 1, 2014 to the present related to any complaints and/or occurrences of remittance payments to Somalia sourced from fraudulent activity, including but not limited to the individuals charged in the Feeding Our Future fraud case, Housing Stability Services Program Case, or the EIDBI Autism Program; and</p>	<p>Claims that the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office does not have data responsive to this request.</p>
<p>Ellison: A copy of the annual data MFCUs submit to HHS for its Medicaid Fraud Control Units Annual Report, including but not limited to: annual statistics, case outcomes, open cases, Medicaid expenditure data.</p>	<p>✓</p>

On December 22, 2025, Chairman Comer sent a letter to Secretary of the Treasury Bessent requesting Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) pertaining to Minnesota social service programs broadly and allegations of financial links to designated terrorist organizations.

Documents Requested	Produced - ✓ (yes) or X (no)
All SARs and accompanying material filed in reference to, relating to, or originating from the Money Service Businesses (MSBs) included in Appendix A for the time period from January 1, 2019 to the present	X
All SARs and accompanying material filed in reference to, relating to, or originating from Riverside Plaza Apartments at 1525 South 4th Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55454 for the time period from January 1, 2018 to present	X
All SARs and accompanying material filed in reference to, relating to, or originating from Karmel Mall at 2910 Pleasant Ave, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55408 for the time period from January 1, 2018 to present	X
All SARs and accompanying material filed in reference to or relating to the organizations and individuals included in Appendix B that have been implicated in fraud schemes in the state of Minnesota, for the time period from January 1, 2018 to the present; and	X
All SARs and accompanying material filed in reference to or relating to funds that are known or suspected to have been sent to foreign jurisdictions, including for known or suspected terrorist activity, by persons from the state of Minnesota.	X

On January 23, 2026, Chairman Comer sent a letter to the Minnesota Legislative Auditor Judy Randall requesting documents and communications related to any review the Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor (OLA) conducted regarding the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) and allegations of fraud in the State of Minnesota. Specifically, the letter requested underlying documentation, to include, but not limited to: communications with audited entities, audit documentation, interview transcripts, and preliminary reports related to the Legislative Auditor’s review of waste, fraud, and abuse in CCAP, Feeding Our Future, and Behavioral Health Administration Grants. The Legislative Auditor is in the process of sending documents and communications to the Committee.

Documents Requested	Produced - ✓ (yes) or X (no)
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<p>Child Care Assistance Program: Assessment of Fraud Allegations, Special Review, dated March 13, 2019</p>	<p>In general, OLA does not retain documents for longer than five years. Therefore, OLA Stated It No Longer Has Documents Pertaining to this Report</p>
<p>Minnesota Department of Education: Oversight of Feeding Our Future, Special Review, dated June 2024; and</p>	<p>OLA Stated That It Cannot Provide Documents That Are Part of An Ongoing Criminal Investigation. Committee Staff is Working With OLA to Determine What They Can Provide</p>
<p>Department of Human Services: Behavioral Health Administration Grants, Performance Audit, dated January 2026</p>	<p>Expecting Document Production</p>